Introduction
Should a social planner treat observationally identical persons identically? The answer is positive when treatment is individualistic and a utilitarian planner knows the population distribution of treatment response (e.g., Manski, 2004 , Section 2.1). However, uniform treatment is not necessarily desirable when a planner has only partial knowledge of treatment response. Then there may be reason to implement a fractional treatment rule, with positive fractions of the observationally identical persons receiving different treatments. Here is a simple, dramatic illustration.
Choosing Treatments for X-Pox: Suppose that a new viral disease called x-pox is sweeping the world.
Medical researchers have proposed two mutually exclusive treatments, say a and b, which reflect alternative hypotheses, say H a and H b , about the nature of the virus. If H a (H b ) is correct, all persons who receive treatment a (b) survive and all others die. It is not known which hypothesis is correct but there is consensus that H a is correct with probability 0.3 and H b with probability 0.7.
There are two singleton rules in this setting, one giving treatment a to the entire population and the other giving b. The latter rule, which implies that all of humanity survives with probability 0.7 and perishes with probability 0.3, is preferable to the former one, which reverses these probabilities. However, neither singleton rule is necessarily better than a fractional rule in which a fraction . , (0, 1) of the population receives treatment b and the remaining 1 ! . receive treatment a. Under this rule, the fraction who survive is . with probability 0.7 and 1 ! . with probability 0.3. The fraction min(., 1 ! .) survives with certainty.
The optimal treatment rule depends on social risk preferences. Let s(.) denote the survival rate with allocation .. + 0.3(1 ! .) and the optimal policy sets . = 1. If the planner is risk averse, with f(@) being the log function, then E{f[s(.)]} = 0.7log(.) + 0.3log(1 ! .) and the optimal policy sets . = 0.7. ~
1 The reasons for fractional treatment rules studied in this paper all stem from partial knowledge of treatment response. There may be other reasons for fractional rules as well. For example, aggregate resource constraints may make it infeasible to assign the same treatment to the entire population.
The problem of treating x-pox illustrates how society can use a fractional treatment rule to diversify a risk that is privately indivisible. An individual cannot diversify; one receives treatment a or b and lives or dies. Yet society can diversify by having positive fractions of the population receive each treatment. A fractional treatment rule is desirable if society, as represented by a planner, wants to maximize expected social welfare and is sufficiently risk averse.
The x-pox problem also shows that society may not be able to rely on decentralized decision making to achieve the social optimum. If each person makes his own treatment choice, all will choose treatment b.
These choices are socially optimal if society is risk neutral but not if it is risk averse.
The x-pox illustration is not an oddity. There are many planning problems in which partial knowledge of treatment response can makes a fractional treatment rule desirable. This paper studies several such problems. These problems share some important features: treatment is individualistic, social welfare is an increasing function of a population mean outcome, and outcomes depend on an unknown state of nature.
They differ in the information that the planner has about the state of nature and in how he uses this information to make treatment choices. 1 Section 2 formally sets out the common features of the problems to be studied. I introduce a special case that I repeatedly consider throughout the paper, this being choice between a status quo treatment and an innovation. I also discuss the increasing function that transforms the population mean outcome into social welfare; this function embodies the planner's risk preferences.
Sections 3 through 5 examine three informational variations on the basic problem. Section 3 supposes that the planner is Bayesian. As in the x-pox illustration, the planner places a subjective distribution on the unknown state of nature and maximizes subjective expected social welfare. The generic finding, as in the x-pox case, is that the optimal treatment rule is a singleton if society is risk neutral and is fractional if society is sufficiently risk averse.
Section 4 supposes that the planner has no subjective or empirical information about the unknown state of nature and that he chooses a treatment rule minimizing maximum regret. Manski (2005a, Chapter 2) and Manski (2005b) have analyzed this problem when there are two treatments, the planner is risk-neutral, and partial knowledge of treatment response is a consequence of a missing data problem. There I found that the minimax-regret rule is fractional whenever both treatments are undominated. The present analysis extends this finding to general problems of choice between two treatments.
Section 5 supposes that the planner has sample data on treatment outcomes and, following Wald (1950), evaluates a treatment rule by its frequentist expected performance across repeated samples. Manski (2005a, Chapter 3) and Manski and Tetenov (2005) have analyzed choice between a status quo treatment and an innovation when treatments have binary outcomes and when the data are the outcomes of an experiment assigning a random sample of subjects to the innovation. I summarize the findings here.
The concluding Section 6 puts aside the literal notion of a planner who makes decisions on behalf of society and considers the feasibility of implementing fractional treatment rules in functioning democracies.
A possible legal/ethical impediment is the normative principle calling for "equal treatment of equals." A possible political advantage of fractional rules is that they convexify the collective problem of treatment choice -whereas discrete choice among singleton rules often is politically difficult, continuous choice among fractional rules may be less contentious. Enabling treatment trading may possibly increase public acceptance and the social value of fractional rules.
Throughout this paper, I maintain the simplifying assumption that the members of the population are observationally identical. If persons have observable covariates, the planner can differentially treat persons with different covariates. Many planning problems are separable across covariance values if the planner is risk neutral; see, for example, Manski (2005a, Chapter 2) . In such cases, the analysis of this paper can be applied independently to each subpopulation of observationally identical persons. However, planning problems typically are not separable if the planner is not risk neutral, and it appears that analysis becomes much more complex. This paper also maintains the simplifying assumption of a one-period planning problem, which gives the planner no opportunity to actively learn through experience. In multiple-period problems, the possibility of learning introduces a further argument for fractional treatment rules. That is, observation of the outcomes experienced by persons who receive different treatments today may enable society to learn about treatment response and, hence, to improve treatment decisions tomorrow. The randomized clinical trials of medical research exemplify this reason for fractional rules.
Preliminaries

Basic Concepts
The basic concepts are as in Manski (2004 Manski ( , 2005a Manski ( , 2005b , with one essential generalization. I have previously assumed that the planner wants to maximize a population mean outcome; thus, society is risk neutral. I now suppose that the planner wants to maximize a strictly increasing function of this mean outcome. This generalization is immaterial if the planner knows the population distribution of treatment response, but it is consequential in settings with partial knowledge. The planner's problem is to choose treatments from a finite set T of mutually exclusive and exhaustive treatments. Each member j of the treatment population, denoted J, has a response function y j (@): T 6 Y mapping treatments t 0 T into responses y j (t) 0 Y. The contribution to social welfare from assigning treatment t to person j is u j (t) / u[y j (t), t], where u(@, @): Y × T 6 R. At the time of treatment choice, the planner knows the form of u[y j (t), t] but does not know the value of its first argument y j (t). For example, u[y j (t), t] may have the "benefit-cost" form u[y j (t), t] = y j (t) + c j (t), where c(t) is the known real-valued cost of treatment t and y j (t) is the unknown real-valued benefit of this treatment.
2 Fractional treatment rules are randomized from the perspective of the treatment population. The planner views the members of the population as observationally identical and, hence, must use some effectively random mechanism to assign specific persons to treatments. Thus, under rule z, each person j has probability z(t) of receiving treatment t.
Fractional rules as defined here are not randomized in the decision theoretic sense of mixed strategies. Rule z assigns fixed fractions of the population to the treatments in T. A mixed strategy would have these fractions be random, with their realizations determined by an auxiliary randomizing device. Formally, a mixed strategy is not an element of Z but rather an element of ) Z , where ) Z is the space of all probability distributions on Z.
Most of the analysis of this paper would not change if I were to define the space of feasible treatment rules to be ) Z rather than Z. Under the social welfare function introduced in equation (1) below, this generalization is inconsequential if the planner is risk neutral or risk averse. For each z 0 Z, let ) z denote the set of all mixed strategies that have expected treatment allocation z. A risk-neutral planner is indifferent among the elements of ) z and a risk-averse planner prefers z to the non-degenerate members of ) z .
3 This planning problem does not require that the planner be utilitarian but does cover that case. If u j (@) is a monotone transformation of person j's ordinal utility function, then U(z, P) is a utilitarian social welfare function. If u j (@) is a multiple of person j's cardinal utility function, the planner not only is utilitarian but also respects individual risk preferences. Observe that individual risk preferences, expressed in the shape of u, are conceptually distinct from the social risk preference embodied in f(@).
The members of J are observationally identical. A feasible treatment rule assigns all persons to one treatment or fractionally allocates persons across the treatments. Formally, let Z denote the unit simplex on R T ; that is, the space of functions that map T into the unit interval and that satisfy the adding-up conditions: z 0 Z Y 3 t 0 T z(t) = 1. The feasible treatment rules are the elements of Z. Rule z is singleton if, for some t 0 T, it has the form [z(t) = 1, z(tN) = 0, oe tN … t]. Non-singleton rules are fractional.
2
The population is a probability space (J, S, P), and the probability distribution P[y(@)] of the random function y(@): T 6 Y describes treatment response across the population. The population is "large," in the sense that J is uncountable and P(j) = 0, j 0 J. For each treatment rule z, let U(z, P) / 3 t 0 T z(t)@E[u(t)] denote the mean value of u realized under z. I assume that the planner wants to solve the idealized problem
where f(@) is strictly increasing in its argument. The shape of f(@) embodies social risk preferences.
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Whatever the function f(@) may be, a solution to (1) assigns the entire population to a treatment solving the problem
The social welfare achieved by an optimal rule is
The common concern of my past and present research is treatment choice when the planner has only partial knowledge of the quantities E[u(t)], t 0 T and, hence, cannot solve the idealized problem.
To formalize the idea of partial knowledge, let ' denote the set of states of nature that the planner deems feasible. treatment choice when no dominant treatment exists.
Sections 3 through 5 differ in the information the planner possesses beyond knowledge of '. In Section 3, he places a subjective probability distribution on '. In Section 4, he has no information beyond knowledge of '. In Section 5, he observes the treatment outcomes realized by a sample of the population.
Choice Between a Status Quo Treatment and an Innovation
The basic concepts set forth above make plain the nature of the planner's problem but are too abstract to permit an entirely transparent analysis. Hence, I repeatedly find it useful to consider a simple special case.
This is the problem of choice between a status quo treatment and an innovation. It is realistic to suppose that historical experience reveals the population mean outcome of the status quo treatment but not that of the innovation. Thus, the states of nature index the possible mean outcomes for the innovation.
Formally, there are two treatments, t = a denoting the status quo and t = b the innovation. The mean outcomes if the entire population were to receive one treatment are " / E[u(a)] and $ = E[u(b)] respectively.
The planner knows " and knows that $ lies in some set ($ ( , ( , ') of possible mean outcomes.
Consider a rule that assigns a fraction . of the population to treatment b and the remaining 1 ! . to treatment a. The mean outcome under this rule is
The optimal treatment rule is obvious if (", $) are known. The planner should choose . = 1 if $ > " and . = 0 if $ < "; all values of . yield the same welfare if $ = ". The problem of interest is treatment choice when " is known but it is only known that $ , ($ ( , ( , ').
Problems of choice between a status quo treatment and an innovation occur often in practice. In the medical arena, the status quo may be a "standard" treatment for a health condition and the innovation may be a new treatment proposed by medical researchers. Historical experience administering the standard treatment to populations of patients may have made its properties well understood. In contrast, the safety and efficacy of the proposed treatment may be uncertain, the available information deriving from biomedical theorizing, animal studies, and small clinical trials with human subjects. In such circumstances, public agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the United States decide whether to approve new treatments for administration to the population at large. That done, medical practitioners collectively decide whether the status quo treatment and the innovation should co-exist, each finding some application, or whether the innovation should replace the status quo, taking its place as the standard treatment.
Social Risk Preferences
We will find throughout the analysis below that solutions to the planner's problem depend on the shape of the function f(@), which expresses social risk preferences. It is therefore natural to ask how this function should be specified.
Normative economic research on social planning provides little guidance on the matter. Theorists in public economics have studied many planning problems of the type posed in Section 2.1, where members of the population are observationally identical but may differ in unobserved respects. However, they have assumed that the planner knows the population distribution of treatment response. For example, the literature on optimal income taxation spawned by Mirrlees (1971) permits persons to differ in unobserved ability but assumes that the planner knows both the population distribution of ability and how ability affects labor supply. Similarly, the literatures on optimal income-maintenance programs (e.g., Besley and Coate, 1995) , optimal disability benefits (e.g., Diamond and Sheshinski), and optimal criminal justice systems (e.g., Polinsky and Shavell, 2000) suppose that the planner does not observe certain individual attributes but does know both the population distribution of the unobserved attributes and how the attributes affect behavior.
Thus, public economics has mainly studied settings akin to the idealized problem of Section 2.1, where the shape of f(@) is immaterial.
When economists have considered planning with partial knowledge of treatment response, they have largely followed the argument of Arrow and Lind (1970) that a utilitarian planner undertaking many small, statistically independent projects should act in a risk-neutral manner. However, the Arrow-Lind argument certainly does not apply to cases with catastrophic risks such as the x-pox problem. Nor may it be an adequate approximation in many settings with less dire risks. See the discussion of health-related public projects in Zivin (2001).
Bayesian researchers have studied some interesting planning problems with partial knowledge of 4 However, the appropriate degree of risk aversion in the FDA drug approval process has been a matter of continuing public debate. See, for example, Applebaum (2005) . treatment response. In particular, a literature on the design and analysis of randomized clinical trials has examined two-period planning problems in which some members of a population are randomly assigned to treatments in the first period and the experimental findings are used to inform treatment choice in the second period; see, for example, Canner (1970) , Cheng, Su, and Berry (2003) , and Dehejia (2005) . These contributions and (as far as I am aware) other studies of this type invariably assume without comment that the planner is risk neutral.
Public discourse on social planning, although not entirely coherent, suggests strong social risk aversion with respect to health matters. This is evident in the ancient admonition of the Hippocratic Oath that a physician should "First, do no harm" and in the recent embrace by environmentalists of the "precautionary principle." It is also evident in the drug approval process of the U. S. FDA, which requires that the manufacturers of pharmaceuticals demonstrate "substantial evidence of effect" for their products (see Gould, 2002 ).
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I do not embrace any particular specification of social risk preferences here. However, I do often compare the treatment rules that would be chosen by risk-neutral and risk-averse planners. These comparisons shed light on how social risk preferences affect treatment choice in different informational settings.
Bayesian Planning
A Bayesian planner places a subjective probability distribution, say A, on the states of nature and solves the problem
In this way, a Bayes rule depends on the planner's beliefs and risk preferences.
If the planner is risk-neutral, problem (5) reduces to
where
dA is the subjective expected value of E[u(t)]. Problem (6) is solved by assigning the entire population to a treatment solving the problem
Thus, a risk-neutral Bayesian planner generically chooses a singleton rule. Fractional rules are optimal only when problem (7) has multiple solutions, in which case any mixture of these solutions is optimal.
If the planner is risk averse, the specific forms of A and f determine whether the solution to (5) is a singleton or fractional rule. It is difficult to reach conclusions in abstraction, so I focus on the choice between a status quo treatment and an innovation. In this case, problem (5) becomes
Proposition 1 shows that, given some regularity and substantive conditions, one can conclude whether the solution to (8) is a singleton or fractional rule.
Proposition 1: Consider problem (8). Let f(@) be strictly concave and continuously differentiable. Let A be non-degenerate. Let f(@) and A be sufficiently regular that 
is strictly concave as a function of Also observe that, as in the x-pox problem, society may not be able to rely on decentralized decision making to achieve the social optimum. Suppose that persons makes their own treatment choices and that all are Bayesian, with A the consensus subjective distribution on '. Then all choose treatment a when $ A < "
and all choose b when $ A > ". Decentralized decision making may yield a fractional treatment allocation only when $ A = ", in which case persons are indifferent between the two treatments.
A Simple Special Case
A simple special case is amenable to complete analysis and sheds further light on the Bayes rule. Let f(@) be the log function, let ' contain the two elements {0, 1}, with $ 0 < " < $ 1 , and let B / A(( = 0). Then
The derivative of the left hand side with respect to . is
Inspection of the sign of this derivative shows when the Bayes rule is singleton or fractional.
Multiplication of the right hand side of (10) by the two positive terms in the denominators yields 
5 The maximin rule is another criterion that uses no information beyond knowledge of '. It calls for solution of the problem sup z 0 Z inf ( 0 ' f[U(z, P ( )]. This rule is deservedly viewed as ultra-conservative. Consider choice between a status quo treatment and innovation. If there is any feasible state of nature in which the innovation is inferior to the status quo, the maximin rule assigns the entire population to the latter.
If the right hand side of (11) is less than one, then the Bayes rule is fractional with this value of .. Otherwise, the Bayes rule sets . = 1.
Minimax-Regret Planning
The minimax-regret criterion for treatment choice uses no information beyond the planner's knowledge that the actual state of nature lies in '. The criterion is
Here, f * (P ( ) is the optimal social welfare achievable if it were known that P = P ( ; that is, by (3),
The quantity f
is the regret of rule z in state of nature (; that is, the loss in social welfare from not knowing the actual state of nature. I show here that the minimax-regret rule is fractional in a broad class of problems with two treatments. The planner need not be risk neutral and missing data need not be the reason why he has partial knowledge of treatment response. Let T = {a, b}. Then the minimax-regret problem is (14) inf
Proposition 2 shows that solutions to (14) are fractional if a modest regularity condition holds. These facts suggest, but do not quite prove, that the minimax-regret rule must be fractional rather than singleton. To complete the proof requires some regularity in the behavior of R(@; a) and R(@; b); the assumption that these functions are continuous suffices.
Choice Between a Status-Quo Treatment and an Innovation
Consideration of choice between a status quo treatment and an innovation sheds further light on the minimax-regret rule. Let ' contain the two elements {0, 1}, with $ 0 < " < $ 1 . Then the minimax-regret problem is
Let f(@) be continuous. As . rises from 0 to 1, the first term inside the brackets increases strictly and continuously from 0 to f(") ! f($ 0 ) and the second term similarly decreases from f($ 1 ) ! f(") to 0. Hence, the minimax-regret rule is the unique . 0 (0, 1) that equalizes the two terms, solving the equation
The solution depends on the shape of f(@). If f(@) is the identity function, the minimax-regret rule sets
If f(@) is the log function, the minimax-regret rule sets
Comparison of (17) and (18) shows that a risk-neutral planner allocates a larger fraction of the population to treatment b than does a risk-averse one using the log transformation. This illustrates that, although
Proposition 2 shows the minimax-regret rule to be fractional whatever f(@) may be, the specific fractional allocation does vary with social risk preferences.
Multiple Treatments
Does a result as broad and simple as Proposition 2 hold when there are more than two treatments?
The answer appears to be negative. Although minimax-regret rules often are fractional, there exist non-trivial planning problems with multiple treatments which have singleton minimax-regret rules. Here is an example.
Let . * denote the unique minimax-regret rule determined in Proposition 2. Now introduce a third treatment c, so the treatment set is {a, b, c} rather than {a, b}. Then the minimax-regret problem changes from (14) to
Suppose that, in every state of nature, treatment c has the same mean outcome as rule . * ; thus,
Then problem (19) reduces to
Problems (14) and (21) This example obviously has a special structure. In every state of nature, the welfare of treatment c is intermediate between that of treatments a and b. Hence, c is not weakly dominated and, moreover, there exists no state of nature in which it is the unique best treatment. Nevertheless, the example does demonstrate that the behavior of minimax-regret rules can be more complex when there are multiple treatments than when there are two treatments.
Treatment Choice with Sample Data
Suppose that the planner has sample data on treatment outcomes. If he is Bayesian, the analysis of Section 3 continues to apply as stated, with A being the planner's subjective distribution given the sample data. Hence, it is only necessary here to consider how a non-Bayesian planner might use sample data.
Wald (1950) introduced a frequentist version of statistical decision theory. Wald's idea is easy to explain, but working out the implications for treatment choice can be rather difficult. For this reason, I focus 6 The expressions statistical treatment rule and expected welfare are from Manski (2004) . In Wald's terminology, the former is a statistical decision function and the latter is the negative of risk.
on a simple special case analyzed in Manski (2005b, Chapter 3) and Manski and Tetenov (2005) . This concerns choice between a status quo treatment and an innovation when treatments have binary outcomes and the data are the outcomes of an experiment assigning a random sample of subjects to the innovation. Section 5.1 gives the general idea and Section 5.2 summarizes the findings for the special case. Section 5.3 briefly discusses research on other treatment-choice problems with sample data.
Generalities
Wald proposed that treatment rules be evaluated by their expected performance as the sampling process is engaged repeatedly to draw independent data samples. Let Q denote the sampling process and let Q denote the sample space; that is, Q is the set of data samples that may be drawn under Q. Let Z now denote the space of functions that map T × Q into the unit interval and that satisfy the adding-up conditions: z 0 Z Y 3 t 0 T z(t, R) = 1, oe R 0 Q. Then each z 0 Z defines a statistical treatment rule.
Repeated engagement of the sampling process to draw independent samples makes social welfare a random variable. In state of nature (, the expected welfare yielded by z in repeated samples is
Rule z is said to be admissible if there exists no other rule that yields at least the expected welfare of z in all states of nature and greater expected welfare in some state of nature; rule z is inadmissible otherwise. There is considerable consensus among statistical decision theorists that inadmissible rules should not be chosen.
There is no similar consensus on how to choose among the admissible rules, but one possibility is the finitesample minimax-regret criterion
This replaces the social welfare function f[U(z, P ( )] of the earlier minimax-regret criterion (12) with its expected value W(z, P ( , Q ( ) across repeated samples.
Treatment Choice With Binary Outcomes Using Experimental Data on an Innovation
Consider the problem of choice between a status quo treatment and an innovation when treatments have binary outcomes. Let the sample data be the outcomes of an experiment assigning a random sample of N subjects to the innovation. Of these subjects, a number n experience outcome y ( It turns out that the admissibility of fractional and singleton rules depends on social risk preferences.
A Risk-Neutral Planner
Manski (2005a, Chapter 3) considers the case in which f(@) is the identity function. Then the expected welfare of rule . in state of nature ( is
where E ( [.(n)] = 3 n p(n; $ ( )@.(n). In this setting, a theorem of Karlin and Rubin (1956) shows that the admissible treatment rules are ones which assign all persons to the status quo treatment if the number of experimental successes is below a specified threshold, all to the innovation if the success rate is above the threshold, and permits a fractional allocation only if the number of experimental successes exactly equals the threshold. Karlin and Rubin called these rules monotone, but I will refer to them as KR-monotone. Formally, a KR-monotone treatment rule has the structure (26) .(n) = 0 for n < k,
where k is any integer such that 0 # k # N and 8 is any real number such that 0 # 8 # 1.
Manski (2005, Proposition 3.1) applies Karlin and Rubin (1956, Theorem 4) to show that the admissible and KR-monotone rules coincide if ($ ( , ( 0 ') contains values that are smaller and larger than " but excludes the extreme values 0 and 1. This is a striking result. It says that if the planner is risk-neutral, statistical treatment rules are inadmissible if they are fractional at more than one value of n.
A particular consequence is that the finite-sample minimax-regret rule, which is necessarily admissible, is KR-monotone. In contrast, Proposition 2 showed that the minimax-regret rule not using sample data is generically fractional. This difference in findings is intriguing but is open to two interpretations. One might interpret the difference as showing that, from the minimax-regret perspective, even small random data samples qualitatively alter treatment choice relative to the case with no data at all. Or one might interpret it as showing that the finite-sample minimax-regret criterion is not so obvious an extension of the basic minimax-regret idea as it might seem at first inspection.
Risk-Averse Planners
The Karlin and Rubin theorems do not apply to risk-averse planners, but a weaker notion of monotonicity remains relevant. Define a fractional monotone rule to be one in which the fraction of the population assigned to the innovation weakly increases with the experimental success rate. Manski and Tetenov (2005) show that the class of fractional monotone rules is essentially complete. That is, given any rule which is not fractional monotone, there exists a fractional monotone rule which performs at least as well in all feasible states of nature.
Going further, we find that the admissible treatment rules of a risk-averse planner depend on the curvature of the function f(@). We show that, if the curvature is moderate, certain KR-monotone rules dominate certain everywhere-fractional rules. However, this finding is reversed if f(@) has sufficiently strong curvature; then the everywhere-fractional rules dominate the KR-monotone ones.
Other Treatment-Choice Problems
Outside of the setting of Section 5.2, there have been only a few non-Bayesian studies of treatment choice with sample data, and these have all assumed that the planner is risk neutral.
The Karlin-Rubin result cited above does not require that treatments have binary outcomes, but it does require that outcome distributions have the monotone-likelihood-ratio (MLR) property. Bernoulli distributions have the MLR property, so this requirement is unrestrictive when outcomes are binary.
However, distributions with the MLR property are special when outcomes can take more than two values. Whereas the above research assumes that the available data are from a classical randomized experiment, Manski (2005a, Chapter 4; 2005b) considers treatment choice using observational data when treatments were selected in an unknown way. In this case, outcome distributions are partially identified. I
show that a treatment rule estimating certain point-identified population means by their sample analogs is finite-sample minimax-regret.
Implementing Fractional Treatment Rules
The treatment-choice problems examined in this paper, while hardly exhaustive, give ample reason for a planner to consider fractional rules. The standard practice in research on social planning has been to assume that the choice set only contains singleton rules. This is inconsequential in the idealized problem of Section 2.1 and in similar settings where the planner knows the population distribution of treatment response.
However, partial knowledge of treatment response may make fractional rules preferable to singleton ones.
As shown in Sections 3 through 5, the specifics depend on the planner's objective, information, and risk preferences.
The notion of a planner who acts on behalf of society is a useful fiction that greatly simplifies analysis of collective decision problems. Nevertheless, if the findings of this paper are to have practical value in functioning democracies, we must ultimately consider the feasibility of implementing fractional treatment rules in such societies.
A possible ethical objection to fractional rules is that they violate the normative principle calling for "equal treatment of equals." Fractional rules do violate this principle if one interprets "equal treatment" to require that observationally identical persons receive the same element of the choice set T. However, fractional rules are consistent with the principle if it is enough for observationally identical people to have equal probabilities of receiving particular treatments.
Democracies occasionally accept the probabilistic interpretation in the design of major policies, such as random drug testing and the Vietnam draft lottery in the United States. They routinely accept it when they permit the conduct of randomized clinical trials. Indeed, the prevailing standard of medical ethics permits randomized trials only when partial knowledge of treatment response prevents a determination that one treatment is superior to another. The open question is whether democracies would accept broader application of the idea that, when knowledge of treatment response is incomplete, "equal treatment of equals" can ethically be probabilistic rather than deterministic.
A political argument in support of fractional rules is that they convexify collective problems of treatment choice. Political processes often find it difficult to make discrete choices among alternative singleton rules, each of which may be favored by a different segment of the population. Fractional rules open opportunities for compromise, transforming a problem of discrete choice into one of continuous choice among alternative fractional allocations.
Political considerations may also favor application of the minimax-regret criterion rather than a Bayes rule. Determination of a Bayes rule requires specification of a subjective distribution on the states of nature, but different segments of the population may disagree in their beliefs. In contrast, the existence of a consensus minimax-regret rule requires only that the population agree on the feasible states of nature.
It may be that, in some circumstances, enabling the population to trade their assigned treatments would increase public acceptance of fractional rules. During the American Civil War, draftees were permitted to hire substitutes to fulfill their military service. In recent times, various countries have established emissions trading systems for control of pollution, where firms are permitted to trade government-determined pollution endowments. Future research should explore the implications of treatment trading for social welfare.
To conclude, I suggest a specific aspect of American public policy that seems well-suited for implementation of fractional rules. This is the drug approval process of the Food and Drug Administration.
The present process essentially makes a binary choice between unconstrained approval and total disapproval of a new drug. With only these two options on the table, the FDA sets a high bar for approval, requiring demonstration of "substantial evidence of effect." It may be preferable to implement a fractional approval process setting a knowledge-dependent ceiling on the production and marketing of new drugs-the stronger the evidence of effect, the higher the ceiling.
